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vABSTRACT 
Based on numerous high level concerns that the cyber threat is expected to 
increase, as well as the already documented uses of cyber warfare, it is necessary to 
ensure our naval ships are hardened against such attacks.  In doing so, an influence net 
model was designed to discover the likelihood of a successful cyber attack.  However, 
first it was necessary to establish what the best mitigation tools are in defense of cyber 
attack methods.  In order to do so, an expert opinion survey was designed and completed 
by individuals currently working in the field of network security.  In combination with 
the expert opinion surveys and in looking at research and established security techniques 
it should become apparent whether or not ships are taking all the required steps to best 
secure themselves against an attack. 
Though the initial model was designed around a theoretical Naval Station Everett 
ship, with modification the model can be utilized for any naval asset throughout the 
United States and the risk for each particular U.S. asset can be evaluated.  Additionally, 
this tool can also facilitate security funding as well as establishing a means of prioritizing 
the tools for protection if the network needs to be hastily re-established after an attack.  
Ultimately, the protection of a ship’s computer networks against cyber terrorist threats is 
fundamental in ensuring continued effective command and control and ultimately the 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION BEHIND THE RESEARCH 
As stated by the founder of the term “Cyber War,” Dr. John Arquilla, in a PBS 
FRONTLINE interview referring to Operation Iraqi Freedom, “It occurred to me, in the 
wake of that tremendous and lopsided victory of ours, that much of what we did could 
have been held hostage to the disruption of any of those information systems.  That was 
the beginning of cyber war – the idea that the vulnerability of communications could 
cripple an advanced army.  What makes it strong also made it weak.”  The military 
acknowledges this frightful fact and understands the increasingly indispensable nature of 
information technology, as well as how this indispensable technology has transformed 
these systems into high value targets of cyber terrorists, which presents a significant 
threat to both the military and national security. 
In a study by Charles Billo and Welton Chang, Senior Research Associate and 
Research Intern, respectively, for the Institute for Security Technology Studies at 
Dartmouth College, Cyber Warfare; An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of 
Selected Nation States (2004), noted “cyber warfare” as warfare that involves,  
...units organized along nation-state boundaries, in offensive and defensive 
operations, using computers to attack other computers or networks through 
electronic means.  Hackers and other individuals trained in software 
programming and exploiting the intricacies of computer networks are the 
primary executors of these attacks.  These individuals often operate under 
auspices and possible support of nation-state actors.  In the future, if not 
already common practice, individual cyber warfare units will execute 
attacks against targets in a cooperative and simultaneous manner. 
Information Operations Issue Manager for the CIA, John Serbian, in a Statement 
for the Record before the Joint Economics Committee, U.S. Congress on 23 February 
2000, paints a vivid picture.  Serbian states that for adversaries who cannot match US 
strength, the use of asymmetric strategies to exploit vulnerabilities will continue to have 
incentives.  The incentives cyber attacks provide as stated by Serbian include economic, 
industrial, and military rationales.  By way of example: 
 
2“Trillions of dollars in financial transactions and commerce move over a medium 
with minimal protection and only sporadic law enforcement - a structure the most 
complex the world has ever known.  Increasing quantities of intellectual property reside 
on networked systems; and opportunities abound to disrupt military effectiveness and 
public safety while maintaining the elements of surprise and anonymity” (Serbian, 2000). 
John Serbian continues in his explanation of the “threat” to Congress, that the 
information infrastructure that was built is interoperable, easy to access, and easy to use.  
Also, with attributes like openness and ease of connectivity are the same ones that now 
make the systems vulnerable to attacks against automated information systems.  He 
further explains that the cyber threat can “originate from any location, affect systems 
anywhere in the world, disguise origins and travel routes, and do it instantaneously.”  
Further, Serbian explains how being a part of the “cyber attack game” does not take a 
great deal of skill or investment and explains that cyber tools are readily available on the 
internet for anyone to download and use maliciously.  Some tools, he states, even use a 
point-and-click feature to start an attack (Serbian, 2000). 
Serbian also refers to a testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence by Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet in February of 2000.  In 
DCI Tenet’s testimony he stated that the, “foreign cyber threat is one of the key 
transnational issues that we face as a nation.”  Also in that testimony, Director Tenet 
noted that the US is increasingly dependent on “…the unimpeded and secure flow of 
technology” and that “any adversary that could develop the ability to interrupt that 
flow…will have the potential to weaken us dramatically or even render us helpless” 
(Serbian, 2000). 
Cyber warfare has already been used as a tool of military warfare against this 
country, as addressed by Dr. Dorothy Denning, Professor of Defense Analysis at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California and former Professor of Computer 
Science at Georgetown University.  In her book, Information Warfare and Security she 
explains how the US military encountered Netherland hackers during the first Gulf War.  
The hackers were able to penetrate 34 American military internet sites, gathering 
information on military supply systems, troop locations and their weapons, as well as US 
3Navy ship movements and the capabilities of the Army’s Patriot Missile (Denning, 1999). 
Had the Iraqi government suspicions of a trap not prevented them from purchasing this 
data, the length of the war perhaps may have been longer, though it is unlikely the 
information stolen would have actually changed the outcome of the war.  However, this 
does give a general idea of the possibilities and potential use of cyber warfare in the 
future. 
It was the aforementioned CIA statements concerning cyber threats and their 
expected increased use, coupled with the already documented uses of cyber warfare 
addressed by Dr. Denning, that has spawned this research. 
B. GENERAL SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The main thrust of this study will be the design of a model which will help to 
discover whether ships are hard targets, targets of opportunity, targets of choice, or 
simply soft targets.  Looking at research and established security techniques it will 
become apparent whether or not ships are taking all the required steps to best secure 
themselves against an attack. 
Though the “insider” may be the biggest threat to an organization (Denning, 
1999) for the purposes of this study the focus will be on the “outsider” hacker/terrorist.  
To prevent this research from becoming classified, only theoretical data are presented 
concerning what may be considered a typical ship in the Everett, WA region.  Some of 
the past terrorist information and threats addressed in making the model are also 
theoretical unless noted otherwise.  In such cases the information was taken only from 
open source materials such as the internet or unclassified research. 
C. BRIEF EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on identifying the likelihood of a successful cyber attack on 
an Everett based ship.  In order to do so, an expert opinion survey was designed and 
completed by individuals currently working in the field of network security, to determine 
expected levels of protection each mitigation tool provides against known cyberterrorist 
attack methods.  Once the expert opinion analysis was completed it was built into an 
influence net model, along with cyber terrorist motivations and means to determine 
whether or not a cyberterrorist attack is likely to succeed against a U.S. ship. 
4Additionally, the model was tested using various boundary case scenarios to 
evaluate usability, completeness, and accuracy.  The model allows many scenarios (or 
case studies) to be considered in order to produce the optimal outcome for Navy ships.  A 
worst case scenario can also be analyzed to show how much more likely the ship will be 
at risk not having a particular security mechanism in place. 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The benefits of the study are numerous.  First, the expert opinion survey data 
alone will prove vital in determining the best security practices available to counter 
individual attack methods.  Additionally, the work will strive to determine the amount of 
risk navy ships are in, as well as determining what they can do to mitigate the risk of 
becoming targets of opportunity.  Such information will assist in protecting ships from 
attack by giving decision makers the ability to see the main vulnerabilities of a typical 
ship’s computer networks, as well as how important certain mitigation tools are toward 
the defense of a network.  The use of the completed model can also facilitate security 
funding as well as establishing a means of prioritizing the security mechanisms for 
protection if a network needs to be hastily re-established after an attack. 
Though the initial model was designed around a theoretical Naval Station Everett 
ship, with modification the model can be utilized for any naval asset throughout the 
United States, and the risk for each particular U.S. asset can be evaluated.  Ultimately, the 
protection of a ship’s computer networks against cyber terrorist threats is fundamental in 
ensuring continued effective command and control and ultimately the security of this 
nation. 
E. THESIS STRUCTURE: 
Chapter I – Introduction – This chapter provides the thesis statement and 
describes the general scope of the thesis. It gives an overview of the chapters, figures and 
annexes of the paper. 
Chapter II - Background Information – This chapter describes many of the general 
Information Operations’ terms and key concepts.  Additionally, it explores the 
motivations of hackers and cyberterrorists as well as the expected tools used by these  
 
 
5criminals.  The chapter concludes by addressing the protection mechanisms used to 
protect against terrorists (i.e., the DITSCAP process as well as individual mitigation 
tools). 
Chapter III - Situational Influence Assessment Module - This chapter introduces 
influence net modeling and the SIAM program. 
Chapter IV – Model Set-up – This chapter describes how the model for this thesis 
was designed, including node breakdown and link strength assignments.  
Chapter V - Model Demonstration and Results – This chapter describes the results 
of the model. 
Chapter VI - Future Work & Conclusion – This chapter looks at areas of potential 
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7II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global 
reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or 
ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against innocents. 
-The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
September 2002 
A. INTRODUCTION TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Joint Publication 3-13, titled, Information Operations of 13 February 2006 is the 
joint doctrine for U.S. military conducting Information Operations (IO).  It provides the 
guidance to help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO in support of joint military 
operations.  Information Operations is described by Pub 3-13 as the integrated 
employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), 
psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations 
security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to 
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 
while protecting our own. 
In support of this thesis we will look only at Computer Network Operations.  
CNO is the newest of the core capabilities and consists of Computer Network Attack 
(CNA), Computer Network Defense (CND), which will be the focus of this paper, and 
the related computer network exploitation (CNE).  In this day and age of technology, 
CNO capabilities are ever increasing, in parallel with the increasing numbers of 
networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems.  CNO is primarily used to 
attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and 
infrastructure and thus is the IO capability best designed to exploit the new opportunities 
and vulnerabilities of our adversaries as well as protecting our own. (JP 3-13, 2006)  
Specifically, CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks 
to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer 
networks, or the computers and networks themselves.  CND involves actions taken 
through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to 
8unauthorized activity within Department of Defense (DoD) information systems and 
computer networks. CND actions not only protect DoD systems from an external 
adversary but also from exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function in all 
military operations.  
CNE is enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted 
through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated 
information systems or networks.  
As the capability of computers and the range of their employment broaden, new 
vulnerabilities and opportunities will continue to develop. This offers both opportunities 
to attack and exploit an adversary’s computer system weaknesses and a requirement to 
identify and protect our own from similar attack or exploitation.  Therefore, with the 
broad definitions of IO described above it is practical to explain the means in which we 
measure and protect these systems. 
B. INFORMATION ASSURANCE  
Per DoD Directive 8500.1 (2002):  Information Assurance is defined as:  
Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, 
and reaction capabilities.  The Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) defines 
these key terms in their National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary: 
1. Availability
Timely, reliable access to data and information services for authorized users 
2. Integrity
Condition existing when data is unchanged from its source and has not been 
accidentally or maliciously modified, altered, or destroyed. 
3. Authentication
Security measure designed to establish the validity of a transmission, message, or 
originator, or means of verifying an individual’s authorization to receive specific 
categories of information. 
 
94. Confidentiality
Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or 
devices. 
5. Non-repudiation
Assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of delivery and the recipient 
is provided with proof of sender’s identity, so neither can later deny having processed the 
data. 
With key information assurance terms defined we will now look at those that 
threaten information systems as well as their motives. 
C. CYBER THREATS AND THEIR MOTIVES 
Dr. Denning in her book Information Warfare and Security (1999) addresses 
many of the offensive actors of information warfare.  These groups consist of insiders, 
hackers, criminals, corporations, and terrorists, any of which may use information 
systems to conduct intelligence gathering, conduct financial gain endeavors or disruption 
operations (i.e., block legitimate access to information) or, simply as a means of thrill 
seeking.  Though, this thesis is primarily concerned with hackers, criminals and cyber 
terrorists, all of the aforementioned groups from Dr. Denning’s book will be briefly 
explained along with their principle motivations. 
1. Insiders 
This category consists of trusted individuals with inside access (i.e., employees 
and contractors) to a particular organization’s information resources.  Insiders may act as 
salesmen of corporate information, selling the information to organized crime syndicates, 
foreign governments, and/or competitors.  Aside from exploiting information, certain 
disgruntled insiders may use their inside access to destroy their employers information 
and information resources. 
2. Hackers 
This group of offensive players typically consists of those that “gain access to or 
break into electronic systems, particularly computers and telecommunications 
equipment.”  Motivations behind hacking can be numerous including thrills, challenge, 
power and financial gain.  Regardless of a hacker’s motive; their actions damage the 
integrity of systems and can be a major nuisance (Denning, 1999). 
10
3. Criminals 
This category of threat targets financial information resources, and as expected 
are motivated by money.  Criminals look for information such as credit card numbers, 
bank account information and basically anything that can be converted to, or sold for 
cash.  Criminals also utilize internet and other information resources to engage in any 
number of internet scams and frauds. 
4. Corporations 
Corporations are also motivated by money, as well as competitive position.  They 
actively seek intelligence from their competitors, such as trade secrets and frequently rely 
on the aforementioned “insider” for such information. 
5. Government Agencies 
This category consists of law enforcement and intelligence agencies motivated to 
protect public safety and national security.  Dr. Denning describes an example use by law 
enforcement as they target a criminal’s communications and other structures for 
gathering evidence in support of criminal cases, whereas, intelligence agencies seek 
“military, diplomatic, and economic secrets of foreign governments, foreign corporations, 
and foreign adversaries” in support of our nation’s goals of national security (Denning, 
1999). 
6. Terrorists 
Though cyber terrorists have yet to make any major appearances, they are 
considered to be of particular interest because of their potential to do damage.  In 
promoting their cause, terrorists may conduct intelligence gathering to collect 
information about their targets, spread propaganda and conduct attacks “against critical 
infrastructures such as emergency services and financial systems.” Terrorists may also 
utilize the Internet in the same manner as the aforementioned criminals in order to earn 
funds to support there next mission.  
The various groups above have various motivations for their actions, however, for 
this thesis we will focus on four main categories, which are, “financial gain,” 
“intelligence gathering,” “disruption of operations,” and lastly, “thrill seeking.”  Insiders, 
criminals, and corporations are mainly motivated by financial gain, however, a personal 
vendetta could also cause an employee to divulge insider information or commit sabotage 
11
                                                
against his organization.  Hackers, on the other hand, though sometimes motivated by 
money, are more motivated by thrills, challenge, and power as addressed by Dr. Denning. 
With the various actors described, this thesis will now attempt to describe how the 
aforementioned actors accomplish their objectives. 
D. VULNERABILITIES 
Cyber criminals attack an information system via its vulnerabilities, which the 
CNSS Glossary defines as, “a weakness in an information system (IS), or cryptographic 
system, or components (e.g., system security procedures, hardware design, internal 
controls) that could be exploited” (CNSS, 2007).  A key point about IS vulnerabilities is 
that they are similar for everyone and can be exploited by anyone via an Internet 
connection.  Additionally, information about IS vulnerabilities and tools that exploit them 
are publicly available for anyone interested enough to look using any Internet search 
engine.  Navy IS’s are just as vulnerable as other systems and just as susceptible to 
exploitation if they are not properly protected. 
SANS Institute1 publishes what they consider to be the 20 most critical 
vulnerabilities of information systems.  These critical vulnerabilities include versions of 
Microsoft Windows, MAC OS X and UNIX operating system vulnerabilities, as well as 
vulnerabilities with cross-platform applications such as databases, and web applications 
(e.g., Content Management Systems (CMS), wikis, portals, bulletin boards, and 
discussion forums).  Another critical vulnerability SANS addresses is with the Microsoft 
Internet Explorer browser, which is installed by default with Microsoft operating 
systems.  This browser has numerous vulnerabilities that if not patched can allow an 
attacker to corrupt memory, conduct spoofing and even execute arbitrary scripts (SANS, 
2007). 
Another category of vulnerabilities listed by SANs is “network devices” which 
incorporates vulnerabilities with “various products such as Cisco Unified Call Manager, 
Asterisk and a number of VoIP phones from various vendors.”  These particular network 
devices were discovered to contain vulnerabilities that can either lead to a crash or cause 
 
1 SANS Institute (SysAdmin, Audit, Networking, and Security) is a trade name owned by the for-profit 
Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies.  SANS provides computer security training, professional 
certification, and a research archive. It was founded in 1989. 
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a complete control over the vulnerable server/device. By gaining control over the VoIP 
server and phones, an attacker could carry out VoIP phishing scams, eavesdropping, toll 
fraud or denial-of-service attacks. (SANS, 2007) 
E. TOOLS OF THE CYBER CRIMINALS 
Cyber criminals have a myriad of tools to choose from in an attempt to 
accomplish their objectives.  The following list of tools was derived from the US Army’s 
Training Handbook, “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century” 
(2004).  This list is not all inclusive but is a very good starting point. 
1. Backdoor 
Hidden software or hardware mechanism used to circumvent security controls.  A 
backdoor is synonymous with trapdoor. 
2. Denial of Service (DOS) Attack 
An attack designed to disrupt network service, typically by overwhelming the 
system with millions of requests every second causing the network to slow down or 
crash. 
3. Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) Attack  
A denial of service attack that involves the use of numerous computers to 
simultaneously flood the target. 
4. E-mail Spoofing 
A method of sending e-mail to a user that appears to have originated from one 
source when it actually was sent from another source. This method is often an attempt to 
trick the user into releasing sensitive information (such as passwords). 
5. IP Address Spoofing 
A method that creates Internet Protocol (IP) packets using somebody else's IP 
address. Routers use the destination IP address to forward packets through the Internet, 
but ignore the source IP address.  This method is often used in DDOS attacks in order to 
hide the true identity of the attacker. 
6. Key Logger 
A software program or hardware device that is used to monitor and log each of 
the keys a user types on a computer keyboard. The adversary who installed the program 
or hardware device can then view all keys typed in by that user. Because these programs 
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and hardware devices monitor the actual keys being typed, the adversary can easily 
obtain passwords and other information the computer operator may not wish others to 
know.  Key loggers are a type of spyware, which are detailed below. 
7. Logic Bomb 
A software program with malicious code that lies dormant until some event 
occurs, at which point it executes to destroy data on a computer.  If execution is triggered 
by a date or time, as is often the case, the program is also called a “time bomb” (Denning, 
1999). 
8. Packet Sniffing 
A program and/or device that monitors data traveling over a network. Although 
sniffers are used for legitimate network management functions, they also are used during 
cyber attacks for stealing information, including passwords, off a network. Once 
emplaced, they are very difficult to detect and can be inserted almost anywhere. 
9. Spoofing 
Attempt to gain access to an information system by pretending to be an authorized 
user.  Impersonating, masquerading, and mimicking are forms of spoofing. 
10. Spyware 
Spyware is any technology that aids in gathering information about a person or 
organization without their knowledge. On the Internet (where it is sometimes called a 
spybot or tracking software), spyware is software that is put in someone's computer to 
secretly gather information about the user and relay it to advertisers or other interested 
parties. Spyware can get in a computer as a software virus or as the result of installing a 
new program. 
11. Trojan Horse 
A program or utility that falsely appears to be a useful program or utility such as a 
screen saver.  However, once installed, it performs a function in the background such as 
allowing other users to have access to your computer.  The users can then send 
information from your computer to other computers, or allow unauthorized collection, 





A malicious software program, script, or macro that has been designed to infect, 
destroy, modify, or cause other problems with a computer or software program. Viruses 
replicate and attach themselves to a host, (e.g., files) with no obvious signs of its 
presence. There are many different types of viruses, a few examples include: boot sector 
virus, companion virus, executable virus, overwrite virus, polymorphic virus, resident 
and stealth viruses. 
13. Worms 
A destructive software program containing code capable of gaining access to 
networked computers and, once within a computer, causing that computer harm, for 
example, by deleting, modifying, distributing, or otherwise manipulating the data.  
Worms can replicate from machine to machine across network connections, often 
clogging networks and computer systems as it spreads. 
14. Zombie 
A computer or server that has been basically hijacked using some form of 
malicious software to help a hacker perform a Distributed Denial of Service attack 
(DDOS) or send out spam. 
With the tools of cyber criminals and other background information explained 
above, this thesis will now describe SIAM modeling as well as give a basic model to give 
the reader a foundation for SIAM’s use in later chapters. 
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III. SITUATIONAL INFLUENCE ASSESSMENT MODULE (SIAM) 
A. SIAM DESCRIBED 
The SIAM software application is a collaborative decision support tool, designed 
to assist people in analyzing complex problems and issues by breaking them down into 
smaller more workable parts.  The smaller parts allow the modeler to more easily 
recognize and evaluate critical relationships among the varying parts, as well as 
determine the importance each particular part plays in the larger scheme (Rosen and 
Smith, 2006). 
SIAM designers, Dr. Julie Rosen and Mr. Wayne Smith of the Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC), state that their product eases the building 
and analysis of an Influence Net Model, which they define as “a user-created model that 
depicts events and their causal interrelationships. It is a graphical model that facilitates 
brain-storming and complex decision making.” (Influence Nets will be described in 
greater detail later.)  Dr. Rosen and Mr. Smith further state that SIAM is a time saving 
tool which helps users in examining complex problems by use of the various capabilities 
it provides, for example: 
1. “A graphical model that depicts complex, possibly conflicting, cause-and 
–effect relationships in an easy-to-manipulate fashion; and 
2. Comparative quantitative assessment techniques that evaluate the relative 
influencing impacts of these accumulated relationships.” 
Rosen and Smith also note that with these tools and others, SIAM helps “users 
organize and evaluate large amounts of information, and collaborate with others in 
analyzing complex factors and causal dependencies of any given issue” (Rosen and 
Smith, 2006). 
In their description of SIAM, Professors Hayes and Sands of the Naval War 
College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Decision Support Department state “the 
networks created in SIAM can be used to identify important issues, actions, or factors 
that can and do influence a specific outcome in a given situation” (Hayes and Sands, 
2001). 
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Rosen and Smith further state that complex problems are typically solved in a 
group environment (i.e., seminar or workshop) with multiple subject matter experts 
working toward a similar goal.  SIAM can be used in this environment, allowing the 
seminar group to brainstorm, conduct “what-if” scenarios, and break down issues into 
their simplest form to be depicted graphically.  All the while the group can continually 
critique and challenge one another’s logic and quickly make changes to the model, or 
simply revise the model as “data changes or experts’ opinions change,” which can then 
be reassessed for their impact.  Additionally, with the use of SIAM’s documentation 
capabilities, notes can be taken within SIAM to retain the reasoning behind certain 
decisions and changes, as well as documenting reference material and other pertinent 
information (Brodhun III 2001, Rosen and Smith 2006). 
B. SIAM INFLUENCE NET SAMPLE 
An Influence Net is defined as, “A graphical representation of a model, which 
incorporates perceptions and events the user identifies as important in examining an issue 
or question.  Additionally, an Influence Net is a chain of casual influences that, taken 
independently, may appear meaningless, but when linked together, establish patterns of 
behavior and motivating factors in a situation” (Rosen and Smith, 2006). 
A simple Influence Net is provided below to show the basic topology of an 
Influence Net and to help in describing the key elements of the Influence Net model. 
 
Figure 1.   Basic Influence Net Diagram (of buying a car) 
 
Within the SIAM application, the graphical objects which display the chains of 
causal influences are called “nodes” and “links.”  A node “is one of a series of related 
ideas or events that influence an overreaching issue,” and a “link” is the “one-way 
connection between two nodes” and is graphically depicted as a line. 
Nodes within the SIAM model serve various roles: root, parent, child, and initial, 
and are depicted in the model as colored rectangles.  The “root node” is essentially the 
ultimate conclusion, “or desired end state of the analysis.”  In Figure 1 the root node is, 
“Should I buy a new car?”  A “parent node,” which is also sometimes referred to as the 
“cause node,” is an idea or event that influences other events.  A “child node,” also 
sometimes referred to as the “effect node” is an idea or event that results from the parent 
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node.  Sometimes a node can be both a parent and a child, when such a case occurs, then 
the node would be considered a parent when at the source of the link, and a child when at 
the destination.  To reemphasize, child nodes are those that are affected by other nodes 
and parent nodes are those that affect the outcome.  For purposes of the root node above 
the parent nodes are: opportunity (i.e., Is there a car available?), capability (i.e., Can I 
afford it?), practicality (i.e., Is there a need?), and desire.  The last type of node is the 
“initial node.” They are the originating causal influences, and thus lack parental 
influences.  Basically, initial nodes represent the primary assumptions used to construct 
the Influence Net. 
Each node in the influence chain is assigned a belief value to its occurrence, either 
by the user for initial nodes, or by SIAMs’ Bayesian algorithms for all others.  The 
assignment of “the belief value is based on the conditions specified by its influencing 
events and relationships in the Influence Net.”  In looking at Figure 2, we can see for the 
node, “My wife is strongly…” has been assigned a belief value corresponding to, “I am 
very certain that this is a true statement by the user.”  Additionally, you can see how the 
author added other information deemed pertinent into the “description block” for further 
reference. 
 
Figure 2.   Node Properties 
 
The belief value, whether assigned by the user or by SIAM, is easily distinguished 
by a node’s color.  The color key can be seen on the far left side of Figure 1.  The color of 
a particular node allows the user to quickly identify the relative belief value of that node.  
“Four shades of blue represent the degrees of uncertainty in the influencing event’s truth.  
Similarly four shades of red depict the degrees of uncertainty that the influencing event is 
false.”  If a node color is grey, then this is an indication of complete uncertainty in the 
likelihood of the influencing event’s occurrence.  Additionally, for each connecting link 
there are two link values which must be assigned by the user, one for when the cause 
(parent) is true and one for when it is not.  These link value strengths representing the 
impact of the cause on the effect, and can be seen in Figure 3 (Rosen and Smith 2006). 
By looking back at Figure 1 you will notice the link between the nodes “My wife 
is strongly…” and “Should I buy a new car” has a filled terminator circle (or ball) at one 
end of the link.  The ball illustrates “that the parent has a reversing influence on the 
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occurrence of the child node,” whereas, an arrowhead terminator would indicate “that the 
parent node has a reinforcing influence on the occurrence of the child node.” 
 
Figure 3.   Link Properties 
 
With a basic SIAM model explained, this thesis will now show how the SIAM 
software was used to demonstrate a potential cyber attack scenario. 
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IV. MODEL SET-UP 
As previously mentioned the work encompassed in this thesis was designed to 
model a cyber attack on a US ship, which can also be used to help determine the amount 
of risk to a particular naval ship.  To do so, an Influence Net model was designed around 
the premise of whether or not a ship can successfully defend against a myriad of cyber 
attack methods.  As Chapter II of this thesis briefly discussed, potential attackers can be 
motivated by numerous factors, including intelligence gathering, thrill seeking, disrupting 
operations, and financial gain.  Even more importantly, potential attackers have the 
opportunity, as well as the capability to conduct an attack.  The potential of these three 
key components (i.e., motive, opportunity, and means) coming together could prove 
disastrous for a Navy ship, or at minimum a nuisance if not properly defended against. 
Thousands of attacks occur daily on internet-connected systems.  In the first half 
of 2005 alone, IBM reported that virus-laden emails and criminal driven security attacks 
increased by 50 percent, with over 237 million overall security attacks.  IBM further 
reported that the US government was the most targeted industry during that period, “with 
more than 54 million attacks.”  (IBM, 2005)  At that rate it was likely there were over 
half a billion attacks in 2005, with over 100 million of those attacks being directed 
toward government systems, including Navy and other DoD systems.  In addition to 
directed attacks, indiscriminate mass attacks such Nimda, Code Red, Slammer, and 
Blaster, all of which spread rapidly throughout the Internet without sparing vulnerable 
government computers, are also a considerable threat (Common Sense Guide, 2004).  
Thus, the threat of attack is real and the need to protect against said attacks requires 
considerable attention. 
The prevalence of attacks and attempted attacks provide evidence of motivation, 
capability and opportunity, so we will build the model with the assumption that an attack 
has taken place, as will be demonstrated later in this thesis.  Overall, the end goal of 
network security is to defend against attack – which means defending against each 
possible type of attack.  That being said, the root node, “Ship defends against cyber attack  
 
methods” was established, along with the eleven parent nodes, which correspond to the 
different types of attacks we need to defend against, as illustrated by Figure 4.  A 
summary list is provided: 
a. Worm attack aborted 
b. Virus attack aborted 
c. Trojan Horse penetration aborted 
d. Attempt to take over system and turn into Zombie is aborted 
e. Denial of Service attack is aborted 
f. Keylogger utilization attempt is aborted 
g. Sniffer utilization attempt is aborted 
h. IP address Spoofing attack is aborted 
i. Email spoofing attack is aborted 
j. Backdoor installation attempt is aborted 
k. Logic Bomb attack is aborted 
 
 
Figure 4.   Root Node and Parents 
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After determining the end goal (root node) and the many attack methods (parents) 
to defend against, it was necessary to consider the likely security measures utilized by 
U.S. assets and the effect each of these security tools has against the previously 
mentioned attack methods.  Figure 5 illustrates the likely security tools in place to help 
prevent attacks, which are also listed below. 
a. Firewall 
b. Hardening 
c. Anti-virus software 
d. Anti-spyware software 




Figure 5.   Security Tools and links 
 
In establishing link values for the amount of expected protection a particular 
security tool provides against common attack methods an expert opinion survey to gather 
collective experience and compiled opinions was created.  The surveys were then 
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distributed to a small group of graduate level instructors at Naval Postgraduate School in 
fields of computer science and information assurance, as well as to current network IT 
security personnel working in the field.  Each survey was accompanied by a cover letter 
describing the survey along with some clarification statements, as well as a terms and 
definitions list to assist in standardizing responses. 
The survey was comprised of seven sets of questions.  Each set of questions 
focused on one mitigation tool (i.e., system hardening, use of firewall, IDS/IPS, training, 
anti-virus software, anti-spam and anti-spyware software) and the probability that tool 
could prevent a likely attack method.  The attacks considered were those listed in the U.S. 
Army Intelligence Department and described in Chapter II, section E: virus, worm, trojan 
horse, denial of service, backdoor, keylogger, sniffer, IP address spoofing, E-mail 
spoofing, logic bomb, and lastly, being taken over and turned into a zombie.  A blank 
copy of the survey questions is contained in Appendix A. 
The survey questions were in pairs according to specific security measures.  The 
first question was designed to capture the survey takers judgment of the security 
measures impact on attack prevention if the measure is employed; the second question 
was designed to reflect the survey taker’s judgment of the impact on not using the 
security measure.  Each question had an eleven category range, spanning from “severely 
inhibits” to “severely promotes,” which, purposefully matches up with SIAM’s 
measurement techniques for assigning linkage values between nodes.  Each of the eleven 
possible selections has a corresponding numerical value for use in the influence net 
model, with +1 being severely promoting and a -1 corresponding to severely inhibiting.  
A total of four surveys were returned and the discrete analysis of the results is provided in 
Appendix B.  
The results as shown in Appendix B were then used to assign link values between 
each of the seven security tools and each of the 13 attack method (outcome) nodes.   
In summary, if a virus attack were to take place as illustrated in Figure 5, then that 
node would be assigned a 100% truth value to indicate an attack taking place.  The attack 
information would then be linked to the seven different security tools, which on their 
output side were assigned the values corresponding to the likelihood of preventing an 
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attack.  Then after the simulation was ran, the node titled, “virus attack aborted” would 
reflect the likelihood of whether the attack was successfully thwarted given deployment 
of the security mechanisms.  The Bayesian algorithm would then continue through the 
model to the root node titled, “Ship defends against cyber attack methods” to determine 
its probability as well. 
With all the major parts of the model described and illustrated, the model will be 
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V. MODEL DEMONSTRATION AND RESULTS 
To demonstrate the model a notional situation was constructed for use in 
populating the model.  The situation is as follows: 
Let’s say a software company in Seattle, WA fires one of their most 
knowledgably programmers, named Jim, for being habitually late and 
disrespectful to other employees.  Aside from being a very skillful 
programmer, Jim also takes pride in being a pretty savvy hacker and is 
thrilled to put his skills to work.  Earlier that morning Jim, now a 
disgruntled ex-employee, was stuck behind a slow Navy van which he 
blames for his not making it to work on-time and subsequently getting 
fired.  Jim, instead of taking his frustrations out in a healthy and legal 
manner, decides to try and pay back the local Navy by hacking into an 
Everett based ship’s network to conduct a virus and worm attack to cause 
havoc and attempt to bring down the ship’s network. 
The above scenario describes a hacker with both a strong motive as well as the 
means to conduct an attack.  The opportunity is also available since Jim has access to a 
computer which is connected to the Internet.  The potential success of the attack thus 
depends almost entirely on the ship’s vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of the 
mitigation tools used.  As was shown in an earlier chapter of this thesis, numerous 
vulnerabilities exist that if not properly mitigated can be exploited, thus leading to a 
successful attack. 
With the previous chapter providing a detailed description of the initial model 
construction and the above scenario, the remainder of this chapter will focus on 
populating the model with the scenario results and running three separate excursions, or 
examples to show the models versatility as well as to show the likelihood of successful 
attacks based on different criteria.  The first excursion was designed to show how 
effective the attack would be with all primary mitigation tools in place.  The second 
excursion was designed to show how effective the attack would be if the ship did not 
utilize anti-virus software.  The last excursion was set-up to show the likelihood of a 
successful attack if no firewall is utilized. 
 
 
A. EXCURSION ONE 
1. All Security Measures Utilized 
For this demonstration the aforementioned scenario of a virus and worm attack 
takes place.  Therefore, the initial nodes, “Virus Attack Takes Place” and “Worm Attack 
Takes Place” were both set to true in order to indicate that the attack took place.  Next, 
the linkages between the attack nodes utilized, and each of the mitigation tools were set 
to “Severely Promotes the Conclusion,” to allow 100% of the attack to take place.  The 
next step was to assign the linkages between each particular mitigation tool and its 
likelihood of stopping the attack method which were inferred from the expert opinion 
survey results (Appendix A).  The model was then run and provided the following figure 
and results: 
 
Figure 6.   Excursion 1 (All security measures used) 
 
2. Results:  “Virus Attack Aborted” and “Worm Attack Aborted” were both 
determined to have a belief value of .99, and the root node, “Ship Defends Against Cyber 
Attack Methods” was determined to have a belief value of .87.  By looking at the color 
table to the left of Figure 6, we can confirm similar results at a glance.  The dark blue 
colors would translate to the belief “I am extremely certain that this is a true statement.”  
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By interpreting these results the reader should be convinced that the tools in place should 
protect the ship from attack, however, they also show that the prevention of attack is not 
100 percent, therefore, even with all protections in place the possibility of attack does 
exist.  As we will see next, the following results will not be as comforting. 
B. EXCURSION TWO 
1. No Anti-Virus  
For this demonstration the same virus and worm attack occurred, however, this 
time the protection of the anti-virus software was removed from the equation.  To do so 
the link between the causal node, “Virus Attack Takes Place” and the effect node “Anti-
Virus Software Stops Virus” is assigned a value of -1.  This then propagates through the 
model setting the “Anti-virus Software Stops Virus” node to -1, which indicates “I am 
extremely certain this is a false statement,” thereby allowing the virus attack to propagate 
through the model with no impact from that node.  The model was then run again and 
provided the following figure and results: 
 
 





2. Results  
“Virus Attack Aborted” was determined to have a belief value of .69, or a 
synopsis of “I am reasonably certain that this is a true statement.”  The node “Worm 
Attack Aborted” was determined to have a belief value of .38, or a synopsis of “I am 
slightly certain that this is a false statement.”  The overall root node had a belief value of 
.53, or unknown value.  Again by looking at the color table on the left side of Figure 7, 
we should be able to make a similar determination.  The worm attack node is a light 
shade of red instead of dark blue, and the virus attack node is about two to three shades 
lighter of blue.  These results indicate that with no Anti-virus protection there is a 31% 
likelihood that the virus would have gotten through and a 62% likelihood that the worm 
attack would be successful.  In conclusion, the results of the model show that the anti-
virus software is more effective at stopping a worm attack than a virus attack, as well as 
showing that with no anti-virus protection the probability of aborting a virus or worm 
attack is substantially reduced.  The overall likelihood that the ship could defend against 
this dual attack with no anti-virus was approximately 50%, thus, leading to the final 
conclusion - that employing updated anti-virus software is a vital mitigation tool against 
worms and a very good tool for protecting against virus attack.  Though Anti-virus 
protection does prove to provide a large percentage of protection for the above scenario, 
the aggregate of the other mitigation tools can not be discounted since they do add up to 
greater than 65% protection in defense of a virus and 35% for a worm.  The next 
excursion was then set-up to show the effect of having no firewall. 
C. EXCURSION THREE 
1. No Firewall 
For this demonstration the same virus and worm attack occurred once again, 
however, this time instead of not utilizing anti-virus software, the effect of the firewall 
was disabled by following similar steps as Excursion Two. The model resulted in the 
following figure. 
 
Figure 8.   Excursion 3 (No firewall used) 
 
2. Results 
The belief values for “Virus Attack Aborted” and “Worm Attack Aborted” were 
both determined to be .97, similar to the .99 results in Excursion 1.  The root node was 
also very similar with a belief value of .85.  The color table to the left of Figure 8 shows 
that the nodes are dark blue once again, and would translate to the belief “I am extremely 
certain that this is a true statement.”  These results show that the firewall had very little 
effect toward protecting against a virus or worm attack, which is consistent with the 
Appendix B data.  Also, in referring to Appendix B we can see that the firewall is an 
effective tool in protecting against DOS attacks, IP address spoofing and being taken over 
and turned into a Zombie.  Whereas, protecting against viruses and worms the best tools 
were Anti-virus software and adequate training to personnel.  Therefore, if the firewall 
goes down, and all other security tools are in place the ship is still fairly well protected 
from a successful worm or virus attack, though the potential for a DOS attack, IP address 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A few key recommendations are listed below which could improve this research 
project, starting with model improvements, and then followed by future research 
recommendations, and lastly the thesis conclusions. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Model Improvements 
The model presented in this thesis overall met nearly all initial expectations, 
however, to improve its structure and validity for future use, certain points should be 
taken into consideration. 
a. Survey Improvements 
The survey utilized was an appropriate approach for a thesis of this scope, 
it provided expert opinions on the key security practices and their expected effectiveness, 
and then by taking an average of these results a baseline for assigning link values was 
established.  However, to get a more accurate representation of overall expert opinions, 
either a much larger sample size of computer security professionals should be taken, or a 
workshop type forum should be used to collect the best data for incorporation into the 
model.  A workshop consisting of the same experts would allow a forum to discuss all the 
particular security tools and the entire process in building the model in greater detail.  A 
workshop would also provide a means of discussion and debate, giving experts the 
opportunity to convince others of their particular view which may be more correct based 
on experience or more thorough research – possibly coming to a consensus.  However, if 
using the workshop method you need to be aware of “groupthink” issues which the 
survey style eliminates. 
The expert opinion surveys were completed mainly by academic experts in 
the fields of computer science and information assurance.  It would be prudent to conduct 
further research based on more opinions of those currently working as network security 
managers and technicians.  Those personnel would see on a daily basis the summary logs 
and data of in-use security mechanisms (i.e., firewalls and IDS/IPS) and see first hand 
how many worms and viruses etc… were stopped on a given day. 
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b. Add in All Security Tools and Attack Methods 
To keep this model within scope only the most popular mitigation tools 
and likely cyber attack methods were built into the model.  However, future research 
should attempt to explore all security tools and threats which can then be built into future 
models. 
c. Conduct More Testing of the Model 
One scenario of a dual attack (worm and virus) with three variants was run 
to show the model’s functionality and capabilities.  The model should now go through an 
extensive series of scenarios to show its true potential and to demonstrate its usefulness to 
the US Naval fleet and other services.  These scenarios should then be built into 
information assurance training which will be described next. 
2. Recommended Applications 
With a good working model constructed, the model can be used to demonstrate 
the effects security tools have in the prevention of attacks.  The training should be 
designed for senior leadership and system administration personnel.  With the 
demonstration of the model decision makers can now visualize the importance of each 
security measure in the prevention of various attacks.  This visualization should lead to 
the enhanced awareness of cyber threats as well as the best practices for thwarting 
attacks.  Additionally, with the enhanced awareness, the necessary security dollars 
required to buy lacking mitigation tools should come.  Furthermore, the training will 
enhance network administrators’ and technicians’ knowledge as to the importance of 
updating anti-virus software, enforcing password policies and conducting training for 
anyone connected to the Internet. 
3. Future Research 
To further this research the following recommendations are offered: 
a. Conduct a Classified Continuation of This Thesis 
In an effort to keep this thesis unclassified no specific navy ship or its 
vulnerabilities were listed (i.e., what operating system and applications it uses), nor what 
specific security tools they have and use to counter threats.  However, if a classified 
thesis was conducted and a model built based on a specific ship and its factual data, along 
with utilizing actual risk assessment data for a particular region, and then incorporating 
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that data to assign adversary motives, means and capabilities linkages, the user could also 
determine the likelihood of an attack, as well as the likelihood of a successful attack. 
b. Keep the Model Current 
Each particular node and link will need to be researched periodically in 
order to keep the model up-to-date.  Therefore, each station planning to utilize this model 
should evaluate all their security mechanisms and conduct a thorough product review of 
each mitigation tools (i.e., firewalls, IDS, anti-malware etc.).  Additionally, as better and 
better technologies are developed the amount of protection of certain tools is likely to go 
up, therefore a new set of surveys or a workshop will need to be conducted to establish 
new link values for use in the model. 
c. Conduct Cost Benefit Analysis 
In order for the Navy to adopt such a program for service wide use, the 
benefits verses costs must be weighed and the actual cost determined.  The SIAM 
program would need to be purchased from the SAIC corporation and then it would need 
to be approved for use by a DAA. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis pointed out the prevalence of cyber attacks, as well as establishing that 
government computers are not necessarily safe from these attacks.  This thesis considered 
the effects of deploying the best security tools to thwart specific attack methods.  The 
model showed that even with all security tools in place, a ship is still susceptible to 
attack, however, the risk is much less with the tools in place.  This thesis demonstrates a 
possible means of measuring that risk. 
After completing and running the model it proved to be as useful as I had hoped, 
though a few recommendations as listed in the preceding section could make the model 
even more useful.  Overall, the model does seem to have the key components of a good 
model such as adequate scope, complexity, and re-use.  As far as the scope, I believe this 
particular model adequately modeled the system to be studied (i.e., network security) and 
that once populated and run could provide the user with enough information that he/she 
could make a good decision.  Additionally the model was clear and easy to understand, 
yet complex enough to answer the question of interest.  Lastly, the model has re-use 
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potential.  In addition to being a good training tool, the model with modification could be 
used to model any number of threat scenarios and provide the likelihood of their success. 
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APPENDIX A  EXPERT OPINION SURVEY 
The following survey was distributed to various Naval Postgraduate School 
professors in the fields of Computer Science and Information Assurance as well as to 
technical personnel working as network security administrators.  The survey was 
designed to gather collective experience and compiled opinions of the domain experts; 
they do not represent product review evaluations of network systems.  The data collected 
was then averaged and used to assign link strength values within the SIAM model.  
Unfortunately only four surveys were returned.  The summary results of all surveys are 
attached as Appendix B. 
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APPENDIX B  EXPERT OPINION SUMMARY RESULTS 
The following results are comprised from the seven sets of questions which made-
up the expert opinion survey.  As you may remember from Chapter 2 the survey 
questions came in pairs.  The first question was designed to capture the survey takers 
judgment of the security measures impact on attack prevention if the measure is 
employed; the second question was designed to reflect the survey taker’s judgment of the 
impact on not using the security measure.  Each question had an eleven category range, 
spanning from “severely inhibits” to “severely promotes,” which matches up with 
SIAM’s measurement techniques for assigning linkage values between nodes.  Each of 
the eleven possible selections has a corresponding numerical value for use in the 
influence net model, with +1 being severely promoting and a -1 corresponding to 
severely inhibiting.   
1. RESULTS IF FIREWALL WERE USED 
 




3. RESULTS IF IDS/IPS WERE USED 
 
 




5. RESULTS IF HARDENING WAS USED 
 
 




7. RESULTS IF ADEQUATE TRAINING WAS USED 
 
 
8. RESULTS IF ADEQUATE TRAINING WERE NOT USED 
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9. RESULTS IF ANTI-VIRUS SOFTWARE WAS USED 
 
 
10. RESULTS IF ANTI-VIRUS SOFTWARE WAS NOT USED 
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11. RESULTS IF SPAM FILTER WERE USED 
 
 
12. RESULTS IF SPAM FILTER WERE NOT USED 
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13. RESULTS IF ANTI-SPYWARE WERE USED 
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